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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF

THE STATE OF UTAH

SMITH BROTHERS LUMBER COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
WILLIAM E. JOHNSON and his wife,
LILA JOHNSON,
Defendants-Appellants.

Case
No.10701

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action brought by plaintiff to enforce a
Mechanic's Lien against the defendants, one of whom,
William E. Johnson, purchased or rather acquired the
property in a real estate transaction, during the time
plaintiff had an effective and valid lien against the premises for materials delivered and actually used in the
improvements then being made upon the premises.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This is an appeal from a judgment and decree of
foreclosure of Mechanic's Lien rendered in favor of plaintiff and against the defendant based on a written stipulation entered into between the parties hereto which submits only one question so far as this appeal is concerned,
to-wit:
-1-

"Is the plaintiff, who supplied the materials directly
to the owner of the property, the Skabelunds, under
Title 38, Chapter 1, Mechanics Lien, UCA 1953, as
amended, an original contractor and entitled to 80
days within which to file said lien," or, "Is plaintiff
other than an original contractor under 38-1-7 UCA
1953 and only entitled to 60 days?"
The defendants appeal from the decision of the lower
court holding plaintiff to be an original contractor and
entitled to 80 days within which to file the Notice of
Intention to Claim a Lien. The lien was found to have
been recorded well within the 80 day period.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-Respondent seeks an affirmance of the lower
court's decision, with costs, and for such further action
then to be taken by the lower court as provided by the
terms of said Stipulation.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent believes appellants' statement of facts to
be ample and fair, except as hereinafter pointed out, and
so agree with them, but in this regard beleives it proper
to again draw this court's attention to the fact that the
judgment and decree and findings and conclusions entered
herein are based upon the written Stipulation entered
into between the parties by the terms of which there is
only su'Pmitted the above questions which divides the
parties, the Stipulation further providing that in the event
of an appeal to this court and an affirmance by this court,
that then the judgment of the lower court shall include
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costs and attorney's fees as provided by law and the custom of the court, and in the event of a reversal by this
court, then the lower court shall proceed further as to
whether or not the defendants are entitled to any recovery
upon their counterclaim filed therein and if so, how much.
Appellants state in "The Facts," second paragraph, that
William E. Johnson purchased the property on which the
improvements had been made without actual knowledge
of the outstanding debt. Respondent believes that
whether or not he so purchased the property is immaterial
and not within the scope of this appeal but if it has any
materiality, then it is apparent Johnson purchased the
property before delivery of the last materials, on August
6, 1964, and so purchased it before completion of the
improvements and hence the statement "improvements
had been made" is inaccurate. Improvements were still
being made when he purchased the property by the
admitted facts. Both his, Johnson's, senses of smell and
sight should have advised him of improvements being
made. Work in prograss is always notice to one dealing
with the property of the statutory right of the person
furnishing materials to perfect liens therefor. This comment is made because Respondent beleives whether or not
Johnson purchased the property without actual knowledge
of the outstanding debt is immaterial and should form no
part of the facts.
ARGUMENT
POINT NO. 1. THE COURT CORRECTLY HELD
THAT THE PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT WAS AN
ORIGINAL CONTRACTOR UNDER THE PROVIS-3-

IONS OF 38-1-2, UCA, 1953 AND AS SUCH HAD 80
DAYS WITHIN WHICH TO FILE NOTICE OF INTENTION TO CLAIM A MECHANIC'S LIEN.
A: Respondent believes that Section 38-1-2, UCA, 1953
and which reads as follows, is controlling as to whether
or not it, claimant, is an original contractor, to-wit:
"Contractors" and "subcontractors" defined. - Whoever shall do work or furnish materials by contract,
express or implied, with the owner, as in this chapter
provided, shall be deemed an original contractor, and
all other persons doing work or furnishing materials
shall be deemed subcontractors."
Following the statute, under Comparable Provision, it
is pointed out that Iowa Code Ann., Sec. 572.1, Subd 2
("Subcontractor" includes every person furnishing materials or performing labor, except those having contracts
directly with owner, his agent or trustee). There is then
cited Holbrook v. Webster's Inc. 7 U. (2) 148,320 P. 2d
661 from which it appears that the answer to the question
in this lawsuit has been indicated by this court. In this
case, at page 662, after quoting Sec. 38-1-2 and referring
to Sec. 38-1-7 entitled Notice of Claim-Contents-Contents-Recording, had this to say: "The trial court did not
indicate in its Summary Judgment whether or not it found
that Elvin Coon was the owner of the real estate. If such
fact were unequivacably established, then appellant was
necessarily an original contractor." It further appeared
that Webster's, Inc. furnished the building materials to
Elvin Coon, et ux, who as mortgagor, gave a mortgage
to Prudential Savings & Loan Ass'n. who in turn assigned
the mortgage to Ward C. Holbrook, plaintiff, and in which
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I

mortgage, he, the mortgagor, recited that, "the mortgagor
is lawfully seized of the premises in fee simple and has
good and lawful right to mortgage, sell and convey the
same." And the holding by this court was then to the
effect that having sold and delivered materials to the
owner of the property, Webster's Inc. was, therefore,
an original contractor and entitled to 80 days within
which to fiJe its lien under the provisions of 38-1-7. In
fact, Holbrook v. Webster's, Inc. is cited under said Sec.
38-1-7.
Following Sec. 38-1-2, attention is directed to 36
Am. Jur. 46, Mechanic's Lien, Sec. 51 wherein it is stated:
"In order to constitute a lien claimant an original
contractor, there must exist or have existed a contract,
either express or implied, between such lien claimant
and the owner of the property"
citing Prouty Lbr. & Box Co. v. McGuirk, 156 OR 418,
66 P (2d) 481, 68 P (2d) 473, citing RCL. And said
section further provides:
"One who deals with the party in interest who is the
source of authority for the improvement is contracting
with the owner, and not a subcontractor, but is an
original contractor"
citing Jordan v. Natrona Lbr. Co. 52 Wyo. 393, 75 P (2d)
378, citing RLC. See also Freidenbloom v. Pecos Valley
Lbr. Co., 35 N.M. 154, 290 P 796, 798; Mitchell v. McCutcheon, 33 N.M. 78, 260 P 1086; Colorado Iron Works
v. Rickenberg, 4 Idaho 262, 38 P 651, Gray v. New Mexico
Pumice Store Co., 15 N.M. 478, 110 P 603, and other cases
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cited at page 385 of the Jordan case, supra. See also
Words & Phrases Permanent Edition 30, at page 298-299.
Additional cases are also cited under ORIGINAL CONTRACTOR in the 1966 Cumulative Annual Pocket to Vol.
30, including Lakeview Drilling Co. v. Stark 310 P (2d)
627, 630, 210 Ore. 306; Anderson v. Chambliss, 262 P
( 2d), 298, 299, 199 Or. 400. It will be observed from a
reading of the case cited that decisions based on statutes
such as 38-1-2 are in harmony with the holding in the Utah
case of Holbrook v. Webster's Inc., supra.
B: Sec. 38-1-3, Those entitled to lien-so far as applicable to the case at bar provides:
"Contractors, subcontractors, and all persons performing labor on, or furnishing materials to be used in,
the construction or alteration of or addition to, or
repair of, any building, structure or improvement
upon land;"
and then it further provides, "shall have a lien upon
the property upon or concerning which they have
rendered service, performed labor or furnished materials, for the value of the service rendered, labor performed or materials furnished by each respectively,
whether at the instance of the owner or of any other
person acting by his authority as agent, contractor
or otherwise."
The purpose of the lien stah1te is to protect those
therein enumerated who have added directly to the value
of the property by performance of labor or adding materials and is designed to prevent the landowner from taking
the benefit of improvements without paying therefor.
-6-

Stanton Transporation Co. v. Davis 9 U ( 2) 184, 341 P
(2d) 207; King Bros., Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln Co., 13 U
(2d) 339, 374 p (2) 254.
I have italicised part of the statute above quoted
to point out that the statute does not specifically "define,"
"classify," "contemplate" or "create four classes"-contractors, subcontractors, "LABORERS BY THE DAY OR
PIECE" and "MATERIALMEN" as such. To so contend
is simply adding two additional designations or classifications by counsel which are not provided for in the statute
and which is misleading; because the statute does not so
provide does not render it either "ambiguous" or "misleading." The language simply provides for "or covers them"
each of whom are protected and may be entitled to a lien
by complying with the provisions thereof.
Nor does Sec. 38-1-14 providing for the order of satisfaction in the decree provide any inconsistency in providing for the following order: ( 1) "Subcontractors who are
laborers or mechanics working by the day or piece, but
without furnishing materials therefor." It covers those
persons, laborers or mechanics, who so work at the request
of the subcontractors. A subcontractor under our statute,
38-1-2, is one who does work at the instance of the original
contractor for it states that "all other persons doing work
or furnishing materials shall be deemed subcontractors."
Here there is no subcontractor involved. Respondent
would come under ( 3) of said section were others ( 1 )
and ( 2) involved or not. Respondent sees no inconsistcncyency in this classification. It does not attempt to
change the time allowed for claiming liens under 38-1-7.

-7-

Undoubtedly the State has a right to provide for the subcontractor-order of satisfying claimants. This is consistent
with the holdings generally, for the persons designated
in ( 1) and ( 2) could not exceed the claim of the original
contractor against the owner. See 57 CJS Mechanic's
Liens, Sec. 319 and also Garland v. Bear Lake and River
Water Works & Irr. Co. 34 P 368, 9 Utah 350. 40 CJ page
492, note 7. The mere fact, however, that (2) of said
section uses the work "materialman" does not preclude
claimant herein from being an "original contractor." Such
a classification is logical. Otherwise, as pointed out in
Colorado Iron Works v. Riekenberg (Idaho) 38 P 651 at
page 652 the situation could become ridiculous, because
as stated therein, suppose A, the owner, contracts with
B to do all the construction work for $5000.00 and then
contracts with C to furnish all the material for the building for $10,000.00. Then, if as is claimed by the appellant,
B is the only "original contractor" and C is only a "materialman" and both find it necessary to file liens for their
security, what sort of a position are they in? The amount
of C's security from B cannot exceed the contract price
B is to receive for erecting the building and that only
equals one-half of the contract price agreed to be paid
by the owner to C for material used in constructing the
building. This case also holds: "A materialman. who
contracts directly with the owner, and has no privity of
interest or cantract with the contractor for construction,
is an original contractor, under the statute of Idaho, and
as such is entitled to 60 days provided by satute within
which to file his lien." Fitzgerald v. Neal, (Ore.) 231
P 645. See syllabus 14 page 646. "The term, "subcontractor," from its very definition, means one who has
-8-

contracted with the original contractor for the performance of all or a part of the work or services which such
contractor has himself contracted to perform."
At page 6 of brief, appellant refers to Sec. 45-5-12
Idaho Code (Judgment to Declare Prority) and then
states that it is "comparable" to Sec. 38-1-14 and then
cites Riggens v. Perkins et al (Idaho) 246 P 962. Facts
in this case disclose that Perkins, owner, entered into a
contract with Arco Mill & Bldg. Co. by the terms of which
it agreed to "provide all the materials and to perform all
the work in erecting the dwelling according to plans and
specifications." Riggens brought suit to foreclose 8 labor
liens (himself and 7 assignors) for work done on the
dwelling. The court held against him because he did
not deal direct with Perkins and that his contractor, Arco
Mill & Bldg. Co. was statutory agent for the purpose of
giving a lien to persons employed by it direct, but not for
the purpose of making a loborer employed by it the direct
contract-employee of the owner. See discussion (2)
first column at page 963. No one disagreed that the
defendant, Brownell Bros. Co. was entitled to a lien because all of its dealings were had with the owner's contractor, Arco Mill & Bldg. Co., but the classification given
was disputed. The court held that as to the materials it
furnished consisting of paints, hardware and the like in
the sum of $410.00 it was entitled to a lien under classification 2 of the statute, but that as to the heating plant
and its installation it was entitled to a lien under classification ( 3) as a subcontractor, and that no reasonable
theory could support it as having a lien as a laborer. The
decision also states that Brownell Bros. C. "had such a
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contract as, if made with Perkins direct, would have made
the appellant a contractor, not a materialman." See discussion at ( 3) page 964. The evidence supplied by Gem
State Lbr. Co. is not given. The only statement contained
in the case is that which appears at top of second column
page 964 and which is quoted by appellant at the top of
page 7 of brief. It is clear from a reading of the case
that the 1widence produced by Gem State Lbr. Co. was
that it furnished materials, only, at the request of the contractor, and not the owner. It is clear from the case that
a labor lien under the Mechanic's Lien statutes as to the
property being constructed can exist only if furnished
at the request of the general contractor, and that if supplied at the request of the owner, such laborer then becomes an original contractor. See syllabus 5 page 962.
Nor is counsel's statement, bottom page 5 of brief, justified by Sec. 38-1-3 when he makes the statement that it
"contemplates" the classification he makes. Counsel for
respondent states that the holding in the Riggens v. Perkins case, supra, is a decision in its favor.
It is believed that the above two paragraphs in par-

ticular and the previous pages of this brief fully answers
the further contentions made by counsel on pages 7, 8
and the first half of page 9 of his brief.
C. The court corrctly held plaintiff, claimant, entitled to 80 days after completion of its contract to file
its Claim under the provisions of Sec. 38-1-7, the first part
of which provides as follows: "Every original contractor
within eighty days after completion of his contract," and
etc ...
-10-

What else could claimant be other than an original
contractor? The facts admitted are that defendant is
owner, the last materials were delivered to him August 6,
1964, the lien was filed Oct. 7, 1964, well within the 80
day period, the materials went into the improvement, no
other person performed labor or furnished any materials
at the request of either the owner, "or any one acting under
his authority as agent. contractor, or otherwise," claimant,
or any other person. Claimant certainly could not be a
subcontractor. The second paragraph of this section can
have no application because claimant, the only person
who could be an original contractor, had no dealings with
any person, nor did the owner. There is no classification
making any one who furnishes material, a MATERIALMAN. It is difficult to see how this situation makes this
paragraph "a useless and confusing provision." It just
has no application in the case at bar. Jordan v. Natrona
Lbr. Co., supra, syllabus 4 holds that lumber company
that furnished materials upon open account was an original contractor as against contention that formal precise
contract states exact amount of materials needed and
prices to be paid was necessary and that implied contract
was insufficient. It is believed that what counsel concludes is a "genuine contractor's contract" is a term of his
own making and has no application. It is a common
knowledge that contracts for construction are of an endless variety, and are both oral and written, express and
implied, and that they cover labor or material, or both,
and with all kinds of conditions and limitations.
Answering Point 1-B: Sec. 38-1-7 does not classify
lienors in accordance with Sec. 38-1-3. Appellant's state-11-

ment that it does is entirely erroneous. As previously
pointed out herein, neither of these sections CLASSIFY
LEINORS. Sec. 3 sets out who is entitled to a lien, either
for labor or materials "whether at the instance of the
owner or of any other person acting by his authority as
agent, contractor or otherwise." Section 7 makes no attempt at classification. It does not allow MATERIALMEN as such 60 days from delivery of last material to
file notice of lien. The right of a person who furnishes
materials depends on the kind of contract-with whom he
contracts. See extensive comments in the Idaho case of
Higgins v. Perkins, supra, which appellant cites and relies
upon but which respondent believes is a holding in its
favor. It is believed that what is here and previously
stated answers fully the columns shown at pages 9 and
10 of brief.
36 Am. Jur, Mechanic's Liens, 52 Materialmen, states:
"All materialmen to be entitled to a lien, must be
specifically referred to within the statute, for it cannot be extended to that class by construction. Thus,
materialmen are not generally within the term "subcontractor."
. /J1f-l, 1'i,,

See generally said Sec. 52, Materialislll, which is to
the same effect as 57 CJS Mechanic's Liens, Sec. 89, note
2, citing Eberle v. Drennan 40 Okla 59, 136 P 162, 51 LRA
(NS) 68, to the effect that one who furnishes material to
the contractor is entitled to a lien.
My main reason for referring to this comment by the
text is to show that to whom lienors are give liens as
"materialmen" depends upon the wording of the statute
-12-

in question. It will also be observed that in some states,
which is particularly true of the athel- states of California
and Oregon, the statutes have been changed. The meaning of who is entitled to a machanic's lien in the State of
Utah can be ascertained by a reference to the applicable
statutes which appear to be Sections 38-1-2, 38-1-3 and
38-1-7. These statutes specify the persons who have a
right to a mechanic's lien and those specifically not
mentioned are excluded. Holbrook v. Webster (Utah)
supra is cited under 38-1-7.
Again under Point No. IC at page 10 of appellant's
brief, he states that respondent is a "materialman" and
not an "original contractor" for the purposes of Sec. 7 and
cites Sparks v. Butte County Gravel Mining Co. ( 1880)
,55 Cal 389 and Heacock Sash & Door Co. v. Weatherford
( 1931) 135 Or. 153, 294 P 344.
57 CJS Mechanics Liens, Sec. 86 provides: "A mechanics lien can be acquired only by a person who is
within the class or one of the classes of persons to
whom the lien is given by the Statute or constiutional
provision under which he claims" citing under note
24, Riggens v. Perkins (Idaho) 246 P 962, supra.
36 Am Jur Mechanics Liens, Sec. 52 Materialman, is
to the same effect: "Materialmen, to be entitled to a lien,
must be specifically referred to within the statute, for it
cannot be extended to that classification" citing under
note Hiln-Hammond Lbr. Co. vs. Elsom (1915) (Calif.)
154 P 12, and other cases.
57 CJS Mechanics Liens ( Materialman) Sec. 89 provides: "While a materialman has been held not to
-13-

come within some early mechanics' lien statutes restricted to particular class of persons and not mentioning a materialman, nevertheless many statutes,
especially the later ones, expressly confer a lien on a
materialmen or a person furnishing materials," citing
under note 75: Idaho Lumber & Hardware Co. v.
DiGiacomo, 61 Idaho 383, 102 P ( 2d) 637 and Riggens v. Perkins, supra. Heacock Sash & Door Co. v.
Weatherford ( 1931) 135 Or 153, 294 P 344.
The text 57 CJS Sec. 89 states: "the rights of materialmen are fixed by law, and nothing that the owner can do
can change them." Utah Mechanic Lien Statutes do not
expressly confer a lien on "materialmen."
It will be observed that the Sparks case, supra, is one
of ancient vintage, the decision having been rendered 16
years before Utah became a state, and before publication
of the Pacific Reports, the first volume of which appears
to have been published in 1884. The case is reported in
Pacific State Reports, Book 18, page 389. The statute is
not quoted but from a reading of the case it would appear
the decision is based upon a definite classification. From
Hiln v. Hammond Lbr. Co., supra, it would seem it is no
longer the law in California.
141 ALR 323 also cites Hiln-Hammond Lbr. Co. v.
Elsom ( 1915) 171 Cal. 570, 154 P 12, from which appellant quotes extensively at pages 11-12 of brief. It appears
from the quote that the word "subcontractor" has a much
narrower meaining in the mechanic's lien laws which
divides the liens into four classes, including "materialmen,"
"that the term subcontractor as so used must be determined by reference to this classification and to the sub-14-

ject to which it relates," etc. . . Syllabus 2 indicates the
decision was rendered because of the peculiar classification under the heading "materialmen." Utah statutes have
no such classification. The Hiln case is also cited in Riggens v. Perkins, supra, at page 964 to the effect that any
person who contracts direct with the owner is a contractor
and not a materialman. The decision is a holding in plainLiff-respondent's favor.
Counsel then at page 11 quotes from 36 Am Jur, Sec.
52, Materialmen and refers to the Supplement page 7,
supplement to note 20 page 46, from which it appears
clearly that it refers to statutes having particular classifications and so is inapplicable to the case at bar. The very
next paragraph then refers to Anno: 141 ALR 325, which
cites Fisher v. Tomlinson 40 Or 111, 66 P 696 and Heacock Sash & Door Co. v. Weatherford 135 Or 135 294
P 344 which holds that persons who furnish materials
only are not "materialmen" under statutes not having a
classification to that effect. These holdings are also in
plaintiff-respondent's favor.
The case of Hiln-Hammond Co. v. Elsom cited at page
11 of brief has already been commented on above. The
statement quoted from the following case cited. Forsberg
v. Koss Constr. Co. 218 Ia 818, 252 NW 258, is simply a
statement made by the court in the course of its opinion
under the Iowa Statute and can have no application to
the case at bar. The next case cited, Staples v. Adams,
Payne & Gleaves 215 F 322 to which counsel refers is
simply a holding to the effect that proper notice was not
served to bring the case within the peculiar provisions of
the Virginia statute, the construction of which is binding
1
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upon the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. As to the
comments made by counsel pertaining to open or running
accounts making any difference, or the comments following Wilson v. Hind, 1896) 113 Cal. 357, 45 P 685, see
Jordan v. Natrona Lbr. Co., supra.
"The fact that a contract, instead of being for a stipulated sum, is what is known as a "cost plus" contract does
not convert the person contracting with the owner into an
agent or dissentitle him to a lien as a contractor." See 57
Mechanics' Liens Sec. 90, Contractors in General, at page
603. which refers to the cases cited at notes 30 and 31.
Nor is there any requirement that labor must be bestowed
on materials to change the form or make them fit in order
to become a valid lien. It is difficult to see in what manner
the holding in either of these cases favors appellant's contention. The following case of Fisher v. Tomlinson 40
Or. 111, 66 P 696 at 697 is a holding to the effect that
plaintiff, a supplier of building materials, did not come
within the terms of the lien statute, substance of which is
given at page 696 and so was not entitled to a lien. Finlay
v. Tagholm 62 Wash 341, 113 P 1083, 1084 is also a holding that the statute was not compiled with by delivery of
a copy of statement showing when materials were delivered and so not entitled to a lien. The statement quoted
by counsel at page 14 of brief obviously can have no application so far as the case at bar is concerned. Nor can the
remaining two cases cited at page 14 of brief, Stephens
Lbr. Co v. Townsend-Stark Corp., 228 Mich 182, 199
NW 706, 201 NW 213, and Fonnan v. St. Germain, 81
Minn 26, 83 NW 438, have any application to the facts and
statute in the case at bar.
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CONCLUSION
Respondent believes appellant bases his entire brief
upon a fallacy: That the applicable statutes, Sec. 38-1-2,
38-1-3 and 38-1-7 either "contemplates," "defines," "classifies" or "creates" four different classes of liens, one of
which, that of a "materialman" he then attempts to bring
respondent within. The Utah Mechanics' Lien Laws
makes no such classification as I believe has been satisfactorily shown, directly, nor is there any basis for such
an inference. It is submitted that in order to have such
a classification as appellant contends for would require a
legislative enactment. Nor is there anything in the statutes requiring that a contract be in any particular form.
It is common knowledge that construction contracts are
oral or written, or partly each, with all manner of conditions, specifications, and limitations, and that they may
be for labor and material or for labor or material only.
The form is immaterial under Utah Mechanic's Lien laws.
The question rather is, with whom was the contract made?
It is believed that the Utah Statutes are clear and concise,
the meaning and interpretation of all the terms therein
contained appears from the texts referred to and the
cases cited by plaintiff-respondent, and as pointed out in
many of the cases cited by appellant, the meaning of
the language clarified and the sense thereof fixed, if
indeed any doubts exists.
For the reasons given in this brief it is believed that
appellant has not shown where the lower court has erred
either as to the facts or the law and that because thereof
the Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure is entitled to be
affirmed and the lower court entitled to modify the same
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by adding to the amount due the additional costs involved
in this appeal in accordance with the stipulation entered
into between the parties. Respondent so prays.
Respectfully submitted,
GEORGE C. HEINRICH
Attorney for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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